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BANK CONTROL OF TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANIES: PERILS TO THE PUBLIC





VER the past several decades, banks and bank holding companies
have sought to expand their profit-making bases by moving increas-
ingly into non-traditional activities. Recently, some of these entities
have focused on the acquisition of title insurance companies, foreseeing an
opportunity to capture in title insurance subsidiaries the millions of dollars
of business banks currently refer to independent title insurance underwriters
and agencies.
In 1987 Citibank, a national bank, applied to the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency ("OCC") for permission to form a subsidiary which would
engage in title insurance underwriting.' Citibank intended for this subsidi-
ary to issue title policies insuring Citibank's mortgage customers, Citibank's
own mortgage liens, and the mortgage liens of its bank subsidiaries and sister
companies. 2 Because of related litigation against the OCC,3 Citibank's ap-
plication was still pending as 1990 dawned. On January 23, 1990, Citibank
withdrew its 1987 application; however, Citibank advised the OCC that it
contemplates re-submitting a similar application in the future.4
In 1988 First Wisconsin Corporation, 5 a bank holding company, sought
authorization from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Board") to acquire an existing title insurance agency, Milwaukee Title In-
surance Services, Incorporated. 6 The Board granted approval in the same
*@Copyright 1990 by Joyce D. Palomar.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
1. Letter from Louise Firestone, manager of Citibank, N.A. to Emory W. Rushton, Dep-
uty Comptroller of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Oct. 19, 1987) [hereinafter
Firestone Letter].
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
4. Firestone Letter, supra, note 1.
5. Effective January 1, 1989, First Wisconsin Corporation changed its name to Firstar
Corporation.
6. 53 FED. REG. 21,525 (1988).
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In 1989 The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. applied to the OCC for per-
mission to establish two new subsidiaries to engage in the title insurance
agency business. Chase Manhattan proposed that one subsidiary would act
as title insurance agent in connection with residential mortgage loans
originated by itself and its affiliates. The second subsidiary would act as
agent in connection with commercial mortgage loans originated by Chase
Manhattan's Real Estate Finance Sector.8 The OCC approved Chase Man-
hattan's application in the same year.9
Most recently, in May, 1990, the Association of Bank Holding Companies
("ABHC")10 petitioned the Board to add title insurance underwriting and
sales to the list of permissible activities for bank holding companies in Regu-
lation Y" of the Bank Holding Company Act.12 ABHC requested that the
Board commence a rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act to act on the petition as soon as possible.1 3 The Board has taken no
public action at the time of this writing.
A vigorous, but largely ignored, challenge to these banking entities' entry
into the title insurance business has come from the American Land Title
Association ("ALTA"),1 4 the national trade association for title insurers15
and abstractors.1 6 In 1987 ALTA and the Texas Land Title Association
7. First Wisconsin Corporation, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 31 (1989) (Order Approving Acqui-
sition of a Company Engaged in Title Insurance Agency Activities by William W. Wiles, Sec-
retary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 17, 1988)) [hereinafter
First Wisconsin].
8. Letter to Richard T. Erb, Domestic Licensing Manager, OCC from Thomas C.
Lynch, Exec. Vice President, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (March 3, 1989) (copy at-
tached to Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, American Land Title
Ass'n & NYSLTA v. Clarke, 89 CIV 6939 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 1989)).
9. Letter to Thomas C. Lynch, Exec. Vice Pres., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., from J.
Michael Shepherd, Sr. Deputy Comptroller for Corporate and Economic Programs, OCC
(dated June 20, 1989) (copy attached as Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, in
American Land Title Ass'n & NYSLTA v. Clarke, 89 Civ. 6939 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar.
12, 1990)).
10. ABHC represents over one hundred bank holding company members.
11. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1989).
12. Petition for Rulemaking, to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from
Association of Bank Holding Companies, at 10 (May 9, 1990) (copy available from Board;
cleared for public inspection and copying May 11, 1990).
ABHC does not seem to be seeking permission for bank holding companies to underwrite
title insurance; however, the petition is unclear in this respect. ABHC's recommendation is for
the Board to expand Regulation Y's list of permissible "activities" to include "title insurance;"
ABHC's discussion then notes that a former Senate Banking Committee Chair recommended
title insurance underwriting as an appropriate activity for bank holding companies. Id.
13. Id. at 4, 12.
14. ALTA has approximately 2,300 members, including title insurance underwriters, lo-
cal title insurance agencies, abstracters and associate members.
15. The phrase "title insurers" used in this article refers collectively to title insurance
underwriters and the local title insurance companies that act as their agents. When the law
affects title insurance underwriters and local title insurance agencies differently, they will be
referred to individually.
16. Four types of entities may be involved in the sale of title insurance: (1) national title
insurance corporations which underwrite title insurance policies for local subsidiaries, for bar-
related title assuring organizations, and for independent local title companies and abstracter
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sued for a declaratory judgment that two Interpretive Letters issued by the
OCC were not in accordance with the law. ' 7 The Comptroller's Interpretive
Letters No. 368 and 377, issued in 1986 and 1987 respectively, purportedly
authorized national banks and their nonbank subsidiaries to act as title in-
surance underwriters or agents. The plaintiffs also sought a permanent in-
junction against future OCC authorization of title insurance activities for
national banks or their nonbank subsidiaries.' 8 However, in late 1989, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed
ALTA's suit, finding that the Interpretive Letters constituted advisory opin-
ions only and thus did not represent final agency action ripe for
adjudication. 19
In 1988 ALTA contested the Board's authorization of First Wisconsin
Corporation's20 purchase of Milwaukee Title Insurance Services by filing
suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.2 1 ALTA asserted, first, that the Board had incorrectly interpreted Ex-
emption (G) of the Bank Holding Company Act to permit bank holding
company acquisition of a title insurance agency. Second, ALTA complained
that the Board had erroneously determined that the benefits to the public
would outweigh the adverse effects from First Wisconsin's acquisition of a
title insurance agency. 22 On December 19, 1989, the court ruled that the
Board's interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act was not unreason-
able, and that the Board's public benefit analysis, although "terse," was ade-
quate considering the deference due the Board as administrator of the Bank
Holding Company Act.2 3
In 1989, ALTA joined with the New York State Land Title Association to
sue for a declaratory judgment that the OCC's approval of Chase Manhat-
tan's new title insurance agency subsidiaries was in excess of the OCC's au-
thority and void. The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction requiring
the OCC to (1) withdraw the ruling in Interpretive Letter No. 368 which
serves as the basis for the OCC's approval of Chase Manhattan's application,
and (2) refrain from facilitating further the entry of national banks and their
and attorney agents, referred to herein as "title insurance underwriters;" (2) local title insur-
ance companies which own title plants and perform the title search and examination as agents
for the underwriter, referred to in the industry as "local title companies;" but in most of the
federal and state law relevant to this article as "title insurance agencies;" (3) approved attor-
neys and abstracters who work as agents for national title insurance underwriters and local
title companies in areas where no company has established an office; and (4) bar-related title
assuring organizations which most often underwrite their own policies, relying on the searches
and examinations of their attorney members.
17. American Land Title Ass'n & Texas Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, No. A-87-CA-408
(W.D. Tex. July 2, 1987) (challenging Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive
Letters No. 368 (July 11, 1986) and No. 377 (Feb. 6, 1987)).
18. Id.
19. The court's decision was not published. However, a copy may be found attached to
defendant, OCC's, Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, in ALTA &
NYSLTA v. Clarke, 89 Civ. 6939 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1990).
20. Currently known as Firstar.
21. ALTA v. Federal Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
22. Id.
23. ALTA v. Federal Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d at 1065.
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
subsidiaries into the title insurance business. The suit is currently pending in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.24
It is, of course, the economic well-being of its own members that has moti-
vated ALTA to challenge whether banks and bank holding companies
should be permitted to acquire majority shares in title insurance companies
or sell title insurance themselves. Perhaps it is for this reason that bank
regulators have so summarily dismissed ALTA's complaints - seeing them
as mere whinings from disgruntled competitors. Clearly, this is how bank
regulators have responded to complaints made by members of the general
insurance industry since banks and bank holding companies began to move
into the general insurance business three decades ago.25
In dealing with title insurance, however, bank regulators have disserved
the public interest. They have failed to make any distinction between the
appropriateness of lenders controlling general insurers and title insurers.
Bank regulators have failed to recognize that lender control of title insurers
may create conflicts of interest which also negatively impact upon purchas-
ers of real property, including homebuyers, and upon investors in our na-
tion's secondary mortgage market. Bank regulators have further failed to
consider the threat which lender control of title insurers poses to the quality
of title insurance underwriting in the United States, the security of our na-
tion's real property records, and the overall availability of money for real
property investment and development.
This article will briefly examine the laws and regulations which apply to
various banking entities' ability to acquire or become title insurers. It will
then discuss the more compelling public policy considerations which bank
regulators have overlooked. Finally, this article proposes that, since bank
regulators have ignored the public interest when applying existing laws,
lawmakers should amend the National Bank Act, the Bank Holding Com-
24. American Land Title Ass'n & New York State Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 89 Civ.
6939 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 1989).
25. See Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Board of Governors, American Ins. Ass'n
v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cit. 1989); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent. Ins. Agents,
399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Abbot, Scott & Barrett, Banks and Insurance: An
Update, 43 Bus. LAW. 1005 (May 1988); Fogelson, The Crianging Environment for Financial
Services and Products, 38 Bus. LAW. 667 (Feb. 1983); Hemmer, Insurance Underwriting Activ-
ities of Bank Holding Companies, 100 BANKING L.J. 700 (Oct. 1983); Hinkle, Insurance Activi-
ties of National Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 105 BANKING L. J. 137 (Mar.-Apr.
1988); Huber, Insurance Powers of Banking Organizations, 8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 147
(1989); Lange, The Merger of Banking and Insurance: Will Congress Close The South Dakota
Loophole? 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 762 (1985); Ohrenstein, Should Banks and Insurance
Companies Be Allowed to Diversify Into Each Other's Activities? 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 7 (Dec. 1984);
Saulsbury, State Banking Powers" Where Are We Now? FDIC REG. REV. (Mar.-Apr. 1987);
Schweiker, Bank Entry Into Life Insurance: The Insurance Industry Viewpoint, 58 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 8 (Nov. 1986); Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under The Bank
Holding Company Act, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 163 (1983); Comment, Operating Subsidiaries
Under the Bank Holding Company Act: The Decision In American Insurance Association v.
Clarke (AMBAC), 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 189 (1989); Comment, Permitting Sale of Insur-
ance by Bank Holding Company Subsidiaries: A Revised Analytical Framework, 32 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 552 (1978).
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pany Act, and state statutes to specifically curtail mortgage lenders' ability
to own, control, or act as title insurance underwriters and agents.I
II. LAWS APPLICABLE TO NATIONAL AND STATE BANKING
INSTITUTIONS' SALE OF TITLE INSURANCE
A. The National Bank Act
National banks are chartered and governed by the OCC, an agency of the
Department of the Treasury.26 The National Bank Act ("NBA") defines the
powers of national banks. 27 National banks may own nonbank subsidiaries,
referred to in some banking regulations as operating subsidiaries28. Non-
bank subsidiaries of national banks may engage only in activities which the
NBA permits for the national banks themselves. 29
The NBA does not expressly authorize national banks or their subsidiaries
to sell or underwrite title insurance. 30 Yet, in three Interpretive Letters
3 1
the OCC has announced that national banks have the power to underwrite
or sell title insurance, directly or through their nonbank subsidiaries, pursu-
ant to the incidental powers clause of the NBA. 32 The incidental powers
clause permits national banks to exercise, in addition to powers expressly
granted by the NBA, "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking. ' '33
26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 21 (1988).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. 1989).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(c).
29. Id.
30. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 et seq. (Supp. 1989).
31. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
32. Responding to a national bank's inquiry whether the bank or its nonbank subsidiary
could act as "agent in the sale of title insurance," William B. Glidden, Assistant Director of
the Legal Advisory Services Division of the OCC, wrote Interpretive Letter No. 368 (July 11,
1986). Glidden stated that the OCC had determined that a national bank or its operating
subsidiary "may act as agent in the sale of title insurance incidental to its express authority to
make loans secured by real property." [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 85,538 (July 11, 1986).
On February 6, 1987, Richard V. Fitzgerald, Chief Counsel for the OCC, wrote Interpretive
Letter No. 377 in response to a letter and memorandum from counsel for a nonbank subsidiary
of a national bank. The memorandum proposed that the nonbank subsidiary act as an agent of
a national title insurance underwriter and/or form its own title insurance underwriter. Inter-
pretive Letter No. 377 concluded (1) that the national bank's nonbank subsidiary could oper-
ate as a title insurance agent and sell title insurance policies to the national bank's borrowers,
and (2) that the nonbank subsidiary could form a title insurance underwriter to issue policies
to borrowers of the national bank. [Current Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,601
(Feb. 6, 1987). See Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8-9, Ameri-
can Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, No. A-87-CA-408 (W.D. Tex. filed July 2, 1987).
In OCC Interpretive Letter No. 450 (October 1988), the OCC discussed whether a national
bank could act as agent in the sale of title insurance, perform title searches, arrive at legal title
opinions, and perform surveying work in conjunction with real estate loans. William Glidden
again opined that the proposed activities were permissible for national banks as being inciden-
tal to their express authority to "make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit
secured by liens or interests in real estate."
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). For a discussion of various insurance activities for which na-




The OCC's Interpretive Letters 368, 377 and 450 provided the following
reasons for the OCC's determination that the issuance of title insurance is
incidental to banking: (1) banks must buy title insurance to ensure the valid-
ity of their mortgage liens and may do so more easily if they own title insur-
ers; (2) banks must insure their mortgage liens to compete in the secondary
mortgage market and could do so more easily with their own title insurers;
(3) borrowers could purchase owners' title insurance concurrently with ne-
gotiating their mortgage loans; (4) banks would benefit financially from col-
lecting commissions for title insurance; (5) savings and loan institutions have
been authorized to act as title insurance agencies;34 and (6) title insurance
companies were divisions of banks from the 1870s until the Depression of
the 1930S. 35
Certainly, room exists to dispute the OCC's expansive interpretation of
the incidental powers clause of the NBA as authorizing national banks to
own or act as title insurers. First, the OCC apparently has not considered
the purpose of section 92 of the NBA. Section 92 authorizes a national bank
located in a town with a population of five thousand or less to engage in
insurance agency activities.36 The Fifth Circuit has held that since Congress
found it necessary to expressly authorize insurance agency activities in small
towns, Congress must believe that neither the incidental powers clause nor
any other clause of the NBA permits insurance activities by national
banks. 37 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, the OCC lacks the power to
authorize national banks to engage in title insurance activities under the "in-
cidental to banking" clause. 38
Second, in authorizing national banks to sell title insurance services and
own title insurers, the OCC has looked only at financial benefits and conven-
ience to the applicant banks. The OCC has not considered potential nega-
tive effects upon banks which do not control title insurers, upon the land title
industry, upon members of the homebuying public, or upon investors in real
property and in the secondary mortgage market. 39
B. State Banking and Title Insurance Codes
State law determines the substantive powers of state-banks. State banks
are chartered and regulated by the several state banking departments.4°
34. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.74(c)(5)(ii) (1989).
35. See supra note 32. See also infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text (discussing the
fallaciousness of sixth point of OCC's rationale).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1989). A federal judge on May 8 1990 upheld a 1986 ruling by the
OCC that allowed banks selling insurance in small towns pursuant to section 92 to also sell
insurance anywhere in the country. Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Clarke, slip op.
No. 86-3045 (May 8, 1990); National Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, slip op. No. 86-
3042 (May 8, 1990). The decision confirms the OCC's ruling that there are virtually no geo-
graphic limitations on the insurance activities of small-town banks.
37. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
38. Id.
39. These concerns are discussed infra notes 209-52 and accompanying text.
40. Huber, supra note 25, at 162.
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State law also defines the activities permitted to state bank subsidiaries.41
Some states restrict nonbank subsidiaries to those activities permitted to the
state banks themselves. 42 Others allow nonbank subsidiaries to engage in
activities that are not permitted to their state bank parents. 43
Most state's statutes simply do not mention title insurance when identify-
ing the activities permitted to state banks and their subsidiaries." Presuma-
bly, title insurance underwriting or agency activities would be beyond the
powers of state banks in those states. Where statutes also restrict state
banks' nonbank subsidiaries to the activities permitted to the parent bank,
state banks will not be able to own title insurance underwriters or agencies.
Where states do not restrict state banks' nonbank subsidiaries to those activi-
ties permitted to their parent banks, however, the possibility exists for state
banks to own title insurance underwriters or agencies as subsidiaries.
Delaware statutes have expressly prohibited state banks from engaging in
title insurance activities for years;45 a recent statutory revision reaffirmed
that prohibition and deserves mention." In 1989 and 1990, the Delaware
Legislature re-assessed whether state banks should be allowed to conduct
any insurance activities.47 In a surprising turn-around from its former posi-
tion, the legislature in 1990 finalized a new statutory scheme which permits
41. See infra notes 42-44.
42. Eg., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann art. 342-913 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
43. Eg., N.Y. BANKING LAW art. XII (McKinney Supp. 1990)
44. In most states, neither the state banking code nor statutes pertaining to title insurance
mention banks or bank holding companies as providers of title insurance. See ALA. CODE § 5-
5A-18 and § 27-25-1(1986); ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.005, § 06.10.020, and § 21.66.010 (1984);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184 and § 20-1561 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-32-701 and
§ 23-62-108 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-401 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37 § 626.988(2)
and 37 § 627.7711 (West 1988). HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 403.47 - 403.47.1 and § 432-1 (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 26-102 and § 41-2701. (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 311 and ch. 73,
para. 478-612 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1101 and § 40-1102. (1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 287.190 and § 304.22-030 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 241 and tit. 24-A,
§§ 406, 3201 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 3, § 206, art. 4, § 206, art. 12, § 410(a), art. 48A,
§§ 48, 70-80, 242 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167, § D:2, § E:IA and § F:2; and ch.
175, §§ 114-116A & 174 (West 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.311b and § 500.7304
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. § 47-20(1)(2) and § 68A.01 (1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 362.105 -
362.106 and § 381.030 (Vernon 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-102 - 32-1-108 and §§ 33-
15-102 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-101 to 8-1139 and §§ 44-304, 44-1901 (1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 683A.110 and § 692A.011 (1987). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383 and 416.A:1
(1983); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2501 (McKinney 1985) (no insurance agent licensed to sell general
insurance and owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a bank shall sell a policy of insur-
ance covering real property which is the security for a loan made by the bank or by any other
bank owned or controlled by such bank; New York law does not prevent banks from owning
title insurers but appears only to prevent general insurers owned by banks from also transact-
ing title insurance); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-43 and 58-132 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 6-03-
02 and 26-32-01 (1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 6, § 204(A)(8) and § 402; tit. 36, § 5001 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-10 and § 31A-23-211 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 603 & 605
and 3301(9) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 30.08.140 and § 48.29.010 (1984); W. VA. CODE
§ 31A-3-2, § 31A-4-13 and § 33-1-10 (1988); WIS. STAT. § 221.04 and § 3.32 (1980); Wyo.
STAT. § 13-2-101 and § 26-23-301 (1977).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 767 (1974).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 761(a)(14) (1990).
47. See Id. See also House Bill No. 193, House of Representatives, 135th General Assem-
bly (1989) and Senate Bill No. 415, Del. State Senate, 135th General Assembly (1990).
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Delaware-chartered banks to both underwrite and sell general insurance.4"
The new Delaware law has been described as the most expansive in the na-
tion as it allows banks to engage in all aspects of the insurance business. 49
Yet, despite the degree to which the Delaware Legislature was willing to
expand state banks' general insurance powers, the legislature continues to
believe that title insurance underwriting and sales are inappropriate for
banks. The new statute expressly excepts from banks' far-reaching new in-
surance powers, the power to act as a title insurer or transact title insurance
business. 50
Eleven other states expressly prohibit state banks from either selling title
insurance, engaging in title insurance agency activities, or participating in
insurance activities generally. 5' In some of these states, however, state
banks might still be involved in the sale of title insurance in one of two ways.
First, a few of these statutes include clauses grandfathering banks which
were engaged in a general insurance or title insurance business prior to the
statute's enactment. 52 Second, while all eleven state's statutes prohibit state
banks from directly engaging in insurance sales or activities, only three ex-
plicitly prohibit state banks from owning title insurance subsidiaries. 53 In
the remaining eight states, arguably, state banks are only prevented from
direct title insurance sales or agency activities, and not from owning subsidi-
aries that are title insurance agents or underwriters. 54
48. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 761(a)(14) (1990).
49. Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1990, at A2. See generally, In re Citicorp, Petition for
Enforcement of BHCA § 1843(c)(8) to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
from Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., et al, (May 30, 1990).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 761(a)(14) (1990).
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-60 (West 1987) (no bank or trust company shall en-
gage in the business of title insurance, except for any corporation actually engaged in the
business of a title insurance and guarantee company on Jan. 1, 1907); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 6:242 (West 1978) (banks may act as credit insurance agents only, except those engaged as
general insurance agents on Jan. 1, 1984 may continue to be so engaged); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 683A.110 and § 692A.011 (1987) (banks may only sell credit insurance); N.J. REV. STAT.§ 17:46B-6 (1984) (no bank shall act as agent for a title insurance company); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3953.21 (Anderson 1971) (no bank shall act as agent for title insurance company); OR.
R v. STAT. § 715.075, § 744.114(m), § 744.025 and § 707.310 (1987) (omits title insurance
from classes of insurance agents bank holding companies may acquire and for which banks
may be licensed); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-3-46 and § 19-10-9 (1982) (no financial institution
shall act as insurance agent, except for credit life, health and accident insurance); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-3-210, 34-29-160, & 38-75-910 (Law Co-op. 1989) (banks may sell only accident
and life insurance); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-6-201 and § 56-35-101 (1989) (banks may only
sell credit, life, accident, and health insurance and insurance against physical damage to vehi-
cles and homes); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.07-3(h) and § 9.01 (Vernon 1981) (no state bank
or bank holding company shall own, directly or indirectly, a licensed insurance agent, except
one so owned on June 1, 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-205 and § 38.2-4600 (1986) (no lend-
ing institution shall directly or indirectly sell insurance if located in locality with population
exceeding 5000 persons; no lending institution shall own any insurance agency).
Two states, Missouri and Texas, recently considered approving title insurance activities for
state banks. In Missouri, the state legislature rescinded regulations issued by the state banking
department which had authorized title insurance agency activities for banks. Hochberg, Banks,
Bank Holding Companies and Title Insurance, 68 Title News 14, 18 (July-Aug. 1989). The
Texas banking department withdrew a similar proposal.Id.





Conversely, seven states explicitly empower state banks to act as insurance
agents,5" though four restrict permission to banks operating in small
towns,56 and two do not allow an entity transacting any other class of insur-
ance to transact title insurance.57 In those states, state banks meeting the
criteria can directly sell title insurance or own a subsidiary which sells title
insurance. These state banks do not appear to be authorized to underwrite
title insurance, yet they might own a title insurance underwriter in those
states where state banks' nonbank subsidiaries are not limited to the activi-
ties permitted to their parent banks.
Georgia has unique statutory restrictions on the ability of lending institu-
tions to underwrite and sell title insurance.58 First, the relevant statute ex-
plicitly prohibits bank holding companies and other lending institutions
from underwriting any form of insurance other than credit life, accident and
sickness insurance. 59 The statute then lists a few types of insurance which
the state will permit officers or employees of lending institutions, bank hold-
ing companies and their subsidiaries to be licensed to sell as agents, includ-
ing "mortgagee title insurance," but not owners title insurance. 6 Georgia's
decision to permit banks and bank holding companies to sell title insurance
for mortgagees, but not for purchasers of real property, seems to be one
response to the concern that banks could unfairly influence homebuyers to
buy title insurance from the lender to whom they have applied for a mort-
gage loan.6
1
55. See CAL. COM. CODE § 1208 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-2-21 1(2)(b), 11-6-
101(2)(1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2 (Bums 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-17-229
(1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-12-10 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 281, 910-24 (Pur-
don 1971); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-18-1.3.
56. See CAL. COM. CODE § 1208 (West 1988) (commercial banks located in places with
populations less than 5000 may act as insurance agents if so engaged on October 1, 1949);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-2-221(2)(b), 11-6-101(2) (1987) (bank or bank holding company may
not be licensed as insurer or act as agent except in municipality where population does not
exceed 5000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-17-229 (1972) (lending institution prohibited from sell-
ing insurance in a municipality with population over 7000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-12-10
(1978) (lending institution prohibited from directly or indirectly selling insurance in munici-
pality where population exceeds 5000).
57. See CAL. INS. CODE § 12360 (West 1988) (insurer transacting any other class of insur-
ance prohibited from transacting title insurance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-11-108 (1987) (title
insurance company prohibited from underwriting or issuing any other kind of insurance).
New York was included supra note 44 among the states which do not mention title insur-
ance when identifying activities permitted to state banks and their subsidiaries. N.Y. Ins. Law
§ 2501 (McKinney 1985). New York law does, however, bear some similarity to the Califor-
nia and Colorado laws by prohibiting bank-owned general insurers from negotiating insurance
policies "covering real property which is the security for a loan made by the bank." Id. This
statutory language appears to encompass title insurance. See supra notes 44, 56. See generally,
Lange, supra note 25 at 762 (discussing South Dakota law regarding bank participation in
insurance industry); Stromman, Paving the Way in the Financial Services Industry: South Da-
kota Opens the Insurance Industry to Banks, 29 S.D.L. REV. 172 (Winter 1983) (discussing
South Dakota law regarding banks providing insurance).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-23 (Supp. 1983).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 209-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential nega-
tive effects from lenders' implicit tie-ins of mortgage loans with title insurance sales.
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C. The Bank Holding Company Act
A major dispute between bank regulators and the title insurance industry
concerns whether additional restrictions apply to national and state bank
control of title insurers when the controlling bank is part of a bank holding
company system. Today bank holding companies own almost all national
and state banks.62 Frequently, bank holding companies own nonbank sub-
sidiaries as well. 63
Bank holding companies are supervised by the Board" and regulated by
the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA").65 Congress enacted the
BHCA in 1956 in order to limit the activities of bank holding companies and
their subsidiaries to those "closely related to banking" 66 and to prevent their
uncontrolled expansion into the realm of commerce.67
Specifically, sections 1843(a)(1) and (2) provide that, unless an exception
applies, no bank holding company shall:
(1) ... acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company which is not a bank, or
(2) .. .retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company or
engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing
or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized under this Act or
of furnishing services to or performing services for its subsidiaries, and
(B) those permitted under paragraph (8) of subsection (c) of this section
68
The additional activities permitted to bank holding companies under para-
graph (8) of section 1843(c) are those "so closely related to banking or man-
aging or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."' 69 In 1982
Congress amended the BHCA to specifically express that the underwriting
and sale of insurance would not be deemed "closely related to banking."'70
In 1986 the Board concluded that title insurance is included within Con-
gress' 1982 prohibition against insurance activities. 7'
Congress did provide for exemptions from the BHCA's insurance prohibi-
62. A bank holding company is a state-chartered corporation organized for the purpose of
owning and operating one or more banks as subsidiaries of the company. See P. HELLER,
FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW §§ 4-24, 5.0118]-[9] (1986).
63. Id.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (Supp. 1986).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (Supp. 1986).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1986).
67. See Wilson, supra note 58, at 163; Comment, supra note 58, at 552.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (Supp. 1986).
70. Title VI of the Garn-St Germian Depository Institutions Act. See also Regulation Y,
12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8). See generally, Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 33 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 163 (1983) (discussing BHCA);
Comment, Permitting Sale of Insurance by Bank Holding Company Subsidiaries: A Revised
Analytical Framework, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 552 (1978) (discussing BHCA subsidiaries and
sale of insurance).
71. First Wisconsin Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 31, 32 n.6 (1989), aff'd, ALTA v. Federal
Reserve System, 892 F.2d 1059, 1064 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Hinkle, supra note 25, at 141-42.
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tion in seven situations. 72 Three of these exemptions arguably permit certain
bank holding companies to act as or own title insurance agencies. A bank
holding company proposing to sell title insurance or acquire a title insurance
agency under one of these exemptions must prove to the Board, first, that an
exemption applies, and second, that the public benefits from the particular
insurance operation will outweigh any detrimental effects. 73
Exemptions (C) and (F), respectively, cover bank holding companies with
operations in small towns and small bank holding companies. 74 Exemption
(C) allows bank holding companies or their subsidiaries in towns with popu-
lations less than 5000 "or in places that have inadequate insurance agency
facilities" to operate insurance agencies. 75 Exemption (F) allows a bank
holding company with total assets of $50 million or less to engage in insur-
ance agency activities.76 These statutory exemptions appear to allow bank
holding companies to operate or own local title insurance agencies.
Two exemptions to the BHCA's insurance activity prohibition are grand-
father clauses.77 Exemption (D) allows bank holding company subsidiaries
which operated as insurance agencies as of May 1, 1982, to continue those
activities.78 A grandfathered subsidiary may sell the type of insurance it
sold prior to May 1, 1982, but may not sell new types of insurance unless
they first became available after May 1, 1982 and cover "the same types of
risks as, or are otherwise functionally equivalent to" the types of insurance
the subsidiary sold on May 1, 1982.79
There is no record of the Board approving a bank holding company's ap-
plication to sell title insurance or acquire a title insurance agency prior to
1982.80 Additionally, title insurance is not a new form of insurance that
became available after May 1, 1982, nor does it insure against the same types
of risks as the credit, life, homeowner's or automobile insurance that a few
bank holding companies were permitted to sell prior to 1982.81 Since Ex-
emption (D) strictly prohibits product line expansion, bank holding compa-
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (Supp. 1986).
73. Id. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1986).
74. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(C) & (F) (Supp. 1986).
75. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(C) (Supp. 1986).
76. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(F) (Supp. 1986).
77. Id. § 1843(c)(8XD),(G).
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(D) (Supp. 1986) allows the specific subsidiary which was act-
ing as an insurance agency to continue to do so in any state where it was approved to act as an
insurance agency on May 1, 1982, prior to the passage of the Garn-St Germain Act amend-
ments to the BHCA.
79. Id.
80. See ALTA v. Federal Reserve Syst., 892 F.2d 1059, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
81. To depict how narrowly Exemption (D) should be construed, both Senate and House
Committees gave the example of a bank holding company subsidiary selling homeowner's in-
surance on May 1, 1982, expanding that coverage to protect homeowners from loss caused by
volcanos if such insurance coverage became available after that date. See Report of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs on the Garn-St Germain Act (S. Rep. No. 97-
536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3093-95.
See also, FED. REG. 36207-09 (Oct. 9, 1986) for the Board's description of the grandfather
rights under Exemption (D) as "limited to theprecise activities (or their functional equivalent)
engaged in prior to May 1, 1982)."
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nies should not be able to sell title insurance or acquire title insurance
agencies under Exemption (D).
Exemption (G), on the other hand, is the exemption under which First
Wisconsin (Firstar) Corporation has claimed the right to acquire Milwaukee
Title Services, Inc.82 Exemption (G) grandfathers bank holding companies
that were authorized to engage in insurance agency activities prior to 1971
and permits them to continue to act as or own insurance agencies anywhere
in the United States.8 3 First Wisconsin (Firstar) is one of the approximately
sixteen active bank holding companies with grandfather rights under Ex-
emption (G). 84
In 1989 ALTA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit the question whether Congress intended Exemption (G) to per-
mit First Wisconsin, which sold credit life insurance prior to 1971, thereafter
to acquire a title insurance agency. 85 First Wisconsin contended that, unlike
Exemption (D), Exemption (G) does not limit a grandfathered bank holding
company to selling only the specific type of insurance it sold prior to 1971.86
ALTA countered that Exemption (G) should be construed to grandfather
only the insurance activities that the Board had approved prior to 1971.87
ALTA emphasized the concept of grandfathering and pointed to legisla-
tive history which states that Exemption (G) was intended to "grandfather
the insurance activities of a bank holding company registered with the Fed-
eral Reserve Board which, prior to January 1, 1971, was engaged, directly or
indirectly, in insurance agency activities as a consequence of approval by the
Board prior to January 1, 1971.1 '88 ALTA further asserted that even if
Congress intended for grandfathered bank holding companies to expand
from one type of insurance agency activity into other insurance classes, Con-
gress could only have intended those which had been approved for bank
holding companies in 1971 - such as life, auto, and property insurance. 89
ALTA argued that Congress could not have meant to include title insurance
82. See ALTA v. Federal Reserve System, 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(G) (Supp. 1986). Exemption (G) provides an exception from
Congress' determination that providing insurance as a principal, agent, or broker is not closely
related to banking:
(G) where the activity is performed, or shares of the company involved are
owned, directly or indirectly, by a bank holding company which is registered
with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and which, prior to
January 1, 1971, was engaged in insurance agency activities as a consequence of
approval by the Board prior to January 1, 1971.
84. First Wisconsin Corporation, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 31 (1989) (Order Approving Acqui-
sition of a Company Engaged in Title Insurance Agency Activities).
85. ALTA v. Federal Reserve System, 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
86. Brief of Respondent, at 14-22; ALTA v. Federal Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
87. Brief of Petitioner, at 10; ALTA v. Federal Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir
1989).
88. Brief of Petitioner, at 10; ALTA v. Federal Reserve Sys., 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (citing S. Conf. Rep. No. 97-641, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, (emphasis added by petitioner)
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3128, 3134; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-899,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1982)).
89. Id. at 11-14.
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within the grandfathered insurance agency activities because the Board had
not approved title insurance agency activities for any bank holding company
in 1971. The Board adopted First Wisconsin's interpretation of Exemption
(G).90 In approving First Wisconsin's application to acquire Milwaukee Ti-
tle on November 17, 1988, the Board concluded that Exemption (G) allows
grandfathered bank holding companies to conduct any insurance agency ac-
tivities, including title insurance activities.91
In ALTA v. Federal Reserve System 92 the D.C. Circuit supported the
Board's construction of Exemption (G). 93 The court held that, if title insur-
ance activities are deemed to be among those prohibited by section
1843(c)(8), they also must be among those permitted by Exemption (G) to
that section.94 The court construed the legislative history cited by ALTA as
showing Congressional intent to grandfather holding companies engaged in
insurance agency activities prior to 1971 and not just the insurance activities
in which they engaged.9" Additionally, the court found that the Board's
ruling met the purpose of Exemption (G) since it permitted a grandfathered
holding company to engage in a general insurance agency activity.96 The
court accepted without discussion the Board's conclusion that title insurance
is a general insurance agency activity. In addition, the court stressed that it
must defer to any reasonable construction by the agency where the statute is
ambiguous and held that the Board's construction was reasonable. 97
The language of Exemption (G) supports the interpretation given the stat-
ute by the Board and the D.C. Circuit Court. 98 Since section 1843(c)(8)'s
general prohibition against insurance activities undisputedly embraces title
insurance, 99 it appears that section 1843(c)(8)(G)'s general exemption from
that prohibition must also encompass title insurance agency activities.
To approve a bank holding company's owning or operating an insurance
agency under any of the preceding exemptions, however, section 1843(c)(8)
also requires the Board to find that the benefits to the public will outweigh
any possible adverse effects from the applicant performing the particular in-
surance activity. ic The Board fell far short of fully assessing all possible
adverse effects in determining that First Wisconsin's acquisition of Milwau-
90. First Wisconsin, supra note 7.
91. Id.
92. 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir 1989).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1063.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1064.
98. See 12 U.S.C. § 1834(c)(8)(G) (Supp. 1986).
99. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
100. "In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or con-
trolling or managing banks" under 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), the Board must consider whether
the activity performed by a bank holding company or its subsidiary "can reasonably be ex-
pected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or
gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices."
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1986). A full assessment of the potential detrimental effects to
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kee Title would produce a net public benefit because (1) borrowers could
conveniently discuss title insurance when applying for mortgage loans at
First Wisconsin, and (2) no proof existed that adverse effects on competition,
conflicts of interest, or tie-ins of loan approvals to title insurance purchases
would occur.101 While the Board spent four and a half pages in its Order
parsing the language of Exemption (G), the Board responded to Congress'
mandate to weigh public benefits and adverse effects with a mere three
sentences. 10 2 Additionally, the public benefit on which the Board based its
approval of the bank holding company's acquisition of a title insurance
agency is spurious, since borrowers already may apply for title insurance
from independent title insurers when making their loan applications. In
fact, the loan officer, attorney, or real estate agent handling the rest of the
real estate transaction makes the great majority of title insurance applica-
tions for borrowers.
Countering this illusory benefit are the numerous potentially detrimental
effects discussed in the remainder of this article.' 0 3 However, the Board
both ignored the concerns expressed by ALTA and failed to consider any
possible adverse effects upon home purchasers, investors in real property, or
investors in the secondary mortgage market. M4 Nor did the D.C. Circuit
take seriously Congress' dictate to assess possible detrimental effects when
reviewing the Board's decision in ALTA v. Federal Reserve Board.10 5 The
court merely recited the rule that courts must defer to the reasoned judg-
ments of agencies, and concluded that "although the Board's order may
have approached the outer boundary of tolerably terse, [citations omitted], it
was explained in sufficient detail for us to conclude that it was, in fact, sup-
ported by substantial evidence."0 6
The D.C. Circuit should not have felt obliged to defer to the Board's con-
clusion when the Board clearly fell so short of fulfilling the congressional
mandate. Instead, any Board approval of title insurance activities by bank
holding companies should be considered erroneous unless the Board gives
the public from bank holding companies owning and acting as title insurers should include all
points discussed infra notes 173-215 and accompanying text.
See, Wilson, supra note 70, at 163; Comment, supra note 70, at 552.
101. See First Wisconsin, supra note 7, at 32; ALTA v. Federal Reserve Board, 892 F.2d at
1065-66.
102. The Board addressed the balancing issue as follows:
There is no evidence in the record indicating that consummation of First Wis-
consin's proposal would result in any undue concentration of resources, adverse
effects on competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or any
other adverse effects. First Wisconsin will provide an additional source for in-
surance that is particularly convenient for its customers. It has indicated that it
will act affirmatively to ensure compliance with all laws and regulations prohib-
iting tie-ins by advising borrowers that they can obtain title insurance from any
source they choose. Accordingly, the Board has determined that the balance of
the public interest factors the Board is required to consider under section 4(c)(8)
of the BHC Act is favorable.
First Wisconsin, supra note 7, at 32.
103. See infra notes 209-52 and accompanying text.
104. See First Wisconsin, supra note 7, at 32.




more than the token consideration it gave in First Wisconsin's application to
the balance of public interest factors which Congress set forth in section
1843(c)(8). 10 7
From the preceding it is clear that a bank holding company cannot di-
rectly own or control a title insurance company or engage in title insurance
activities unless, in a rare case, one of the aforementioned exemptions applies
and the public benefit is legitimately found to outweigh all possible adverse
effects.108 What is more, sections 1843(a)(1) and (2) expressly prohibit bank
holding companies from "indirectly owning or controlling" a title insurance
company unless an exemption applies. 109 This seems to mean that a bank
holding company subsidiary cannot own or control a title insurance com-
pany, since it would be indirectly owned by the holding company. Neither
sections 1843(a)(1) and (2) nor section 1843(c)(8) appear to make an excep-
tion when the bank holding company subsidiary is a national or state
bank.110
As discussed above, bank holding companies own most national and state
banks.I 1 Therefore, the BHCA would seem to preclude ownership of title
insurance underwriters and. non-exempt agencies by bank holding companies
and most national and state banks. However, various banks have succeeded
in convincing the OCC and the Board to alter this policy.1 12
1. Applicability of BHCA to Holding Company-Owned National Banks
In Citibank's recent notification to the OCC of its intent to establish a
subsidiary to underwrite title insurance, Citibank failed to address the fact
that it is a subsidiary of a bank holding company, Citicorp.' 1 3 In a previous
attempt to acquire a municipal bond insurance company, Citibank con-
tended that the BHCA's prohibition against bank holding companies' sub-
sidiaries owning insurance companies does not apply to the national bank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 1 4 Citibank asserted that only the
National Bank Act regulates natibnal banks' activities, regardless of whether
107. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1986).
108. Id.
109. Id. §§ 1843(a)(1),(2) (Supp. 1986).
110. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(a)(1),(2), 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1986).
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
113. See Letter to Emory W. Rushton, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency from Louise
Firestone, Manager of Citibank (October 19, 1987).
114. The American Insurance Association challenged the OCC's approval of Citibank's
acquisition of the American Municipal Bond Assurance Company, asserting that the OCC
could not approve the acquisition of an insurance business by a bank holding company-owned
national bank unless the acquisition was permissible under an exemption from the BHCA's
prohibition against insurance activities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit agreed in a 1988 ruling that, because Citibank was a subsidiary of a bank holding
company, Citibank could not acquire a subsidiary whose activities might be deemed the busi-
ness of insurance without first obtaining the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System under BHCA § 1843(c)(8). In 1989, however, the court vacated that portion
of its opinion, ruling that the issue had not been properly before the court. American Ins.
Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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national banks are owned by bank holding companies. 115
The OCC also posits that the BHCA's prohibition of indirect insurance
activities by bank holding companies does not affect national banks, despite
the fact that most national banks are subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies, and national banks' subsidiaries are indirect subsidiaries of bank hold-
ing companies. 16 The OCC reasons that Congress intended the BHCA to
correct gaps in the regulation of bank holding companies, not to govern their
national or state bank subsidiaries, which are sufficiently regulated by the
NBA and state law."17 Under this rationale and the OCC's interpretation of
the National Bank Act discussed above, national banks owned by holding
companies are free to engage in title insurance activities or own title insur-
ance subsidiaries." 18
The Board agrees with the OCC that the BHCA's insurance prohibition
does not control the direct activities of the national or state banks owned by
holding companies. 1' 9 However, in its recent orders and in litigation, the
Board has maintained that the BHCA's restrictions do prevent bank holding
company-owned national and state banks from owning insurance subsidiar-
ies, since they would be indirect nonbank subsidiaries of the holding
company. 120
The Board's interpretation comes from parsing section 1843(a)(2), quoted
above, 12 into one clause limiting the types of companies a bank holding
company may own to banks and bank holding companies and a second
clause limiting the bank holding company's activities to (1) banking, (2)
managing and controlling banks and authorized nonbank companies, and (3)
activities closely related to banking.122 The Board, thus, concludes that sec-
115. See supra note 113.
116. Clarke, 865 F.2d at 280. See Letter to Mr. William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board




119. On March 3, 1989 the Board granted the request of a bank holding company,
Merchants National Corporation, to permit two of its subsidiary state banks to engage in di-
rect sales of property and casualty insurance. The Board did so on the grounds that "the
nonbanking provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act do not apply to the direct activities
of holding company banks." See Merchants Nat7 Corp., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 876 (1987);
Merchants Nat7 Corp., 75 FED. Ras. BULL. 388 (1989).
The Independent Insurance Agents of America challenged the Board's order. The court
stayed the order pending a final review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989).
Applying the standard of whether the agency's decision was based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute, the court held that the Board had made a reasonable interpretation in
concluding that the BHCA did not restrict bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company from
selling insurance. Id. at 1280. The Independent Insurance Agents reportedly plan to file a
petition for certiori to the United States Supreme Court.
120. See Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275, 1280-82 (2d Cir.
1989) (citing the Board's Orders in Merchants Nat7 Corp., 73 FED. REs. BULL. 876 (1987) and
Merchants Nat'! Corp., 75 FED. RES. BULL. 388 (1989)).
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (Supp. 1986). See supra text accompanying note 68.
122. The statute's language reads as follows:
no bank holding company shall... retain direct or indirect ownership.., of any
... company which is not a bank or bank holding company or engage in any
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tion 1843(a)(2) only requires bank holding companies, not their banking sub-
sidiaries, to engage solely in activities closely related to banking.1 23 The
Board sees nothing in section 1843 to prevent an allowed bank subsidiary
from directly engaging in any activities permitted by its regulatory
agency.124 Nevertheless, bank holding company-owned national and state
banks could not own unauthorized subsidiaries because the holding com-
pany would indirectly own them in violation of the BHCA.125
Interestingly, the Board's recent interpretation is partially inconsistent
with two of the Board's own regulations. 126 One Board regulation purports
to allow holding company-owned national banks to own shares of subsidiar-
ies of the same kinds and amounts permitted for national banks under the
National Bank Act.127 Similarly, another Board regulation purports to per-
mit holding company-owned state banks to own shares of subsidiaries as
permitted by state law. ' 28 Recognizing the inconsistency, the Board has ini-
tiated a rulemaking proceeding to rescind the latter regulation regarding
subsidiaries of state banks.' 29 Whether the Board will attempt to rescind its
conflicting regulation regarding national banks' subsidiaries remains to be
seen. 130
ALTA presents a third opinion regarding the applicability of the BHCA's
insurance prohibition to bank holding company owned-national banks.
ALTA interprets section 1843(a)(2) to prohibit holding companies from di-
rectly or indirectly owning nonbanking entities and from directly or indi-
rectly engaging in activities other than those closely related to banking.131
Under this reading, any activities of bank subsidiaries would be indirect ac-
tivities of the bank holding company. Thus, a holding company-owned na-
tional bank could not own a nonbank subsidiary or engage in any activities
not authorized for the bank holding company. 132
activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing or controlling banks
and other subsidiaries authorized under this Act . . . , and (B) activities so
closely related to banking as to be incidental thereto.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (Supp. 1986). See supra text accompanying note 68.
123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (Supp. 1986).
126. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1),(2) (1989).
127. 12 C.F.R § 225.22(d)(1) (1989).
128. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2) (1989).
129. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 FED. REG. 48915, 48921 - 24 (Dec. 5, 1988).
130. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1) (1989).
131. Brief for Petitioner at 8, ALTA v. Federal Reserve System, 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Letter to Robert Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency from Sheldon E. Hochberg,
Counsel to the ALTA regarding Citibank's application to establish a subsidiary to engage in
title insurance underwriting at 3, 4 n.2 (Jan. 31, 1989).
ALTA bases its interpretation, in part, on language in the Senate Conference Report on
Title VI of the Garn-St Germain Act, S. Rep. No. 97-641, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 91 (1982),
which states that Title VI prohibits "bank holding companies and their subsidiaries" from
selling and underwriting insurance. The Senate did not say only nonbank subsidiaries were
precluded from insurance activities.
132. The Second Circuit described this interpretation, asserted by the general insurance
agency, as having "the virtue of consistency." Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Gover-
nors, 890 F.2d 1275, 1282 (1989).
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2. Applicability of BHCA to Holding Company-Owned State Banks
Consistent with its view that the BHCA does not prevent holding com-
pany-owned national banks from direct insurance sales, the Board also has
taken the position that the BHCA does not prohibit holding company-
owned state banks from selling insurance.1 33 According to this theory, state
banks owned by bank holding companies may directly underwrite or sell
title insurance if state law permits. 134 The Board, however, again maintains
that holding company-owned state banks are prohibited from owning title
insurance companies, since the title insurance company would be an indirect
subsidiary of the bank holding company and thus unauthorized under sec-
tion 1843(a)(2). 135
The Board's conclusion that the BHCA does not prohibit direct insurance
sales by holding company-owned state banks recently survived a challenge
by the general insurance industry. 136 In March of 1989, the Independent
Insurance Agents of America ("IIAA") sued to overturn Board approval of
direct property and casualty insurance sales by two Indiana state banks
owned by a bank holding company, Merchants National Corporation. 137
IIAA contended that sections 1843(a)(2) and 1843(c)(8) prohibit bank hold-
ing companies and all of their direct and indirect subsidiaries from engaging
in the insurance business. 138 IIAA argued that any other rule would permit
bank holding companies to evade the BHCA merely by merging a prohibited
nonbank subsidiary into a bank subsidiary which could then operate the
nonbank activity itself. This precise scenario had occurred in the case before
the court.1 39
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the insurance industry's position
had "the virtue of consistency." 140 The court stated that unless the BHCA
unambiguously expressed Congress' intent, the court was limited to deter-
mining whether the Board's construction of the BHCA was permissible.1 41
The court then held that the BHCA is ambiguous on the question and up-
133. See supra note 125.
The Board's position on this issue seems to have fluctuated dramatically over the years. On
January 5, 1984, the Board announced its tentative judgment that it could not approve the
applications of three major bank holding companies (Citicorp of New York, BankAmerica
Corp. and First Interstate Bancorp of California) to acquire state banks in South Dakota, a
state which permitted banks to conduct insurance activities. The Board opined that bank
holding companies could not use state bank subsidiaries to perform activities prohibited by the
BHCA. The Board stated that only Congress and not state legislatures may enlarge the pow-
ers of bank holding companies. See Wilson, supra note 70, at 184-85. See also, Huber, note 25,
at 163, for the view that the Board's opinion on this issue has never changed; the Board denied
the preceding applications solely because the banks were designed to serve primarily as vehi-
cles for conducting insurance activities and would conduct only minimal banking activities.
134. See supra note 119.
135. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
136. See Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d
Cir. 1989).
137. Id.






held the Board's interpretation as a reasonable construction that must stand
until Congress enacts suitable legislation.' 42 The court did note a perplexing
inconsistency in the Board's ruling that activities of holding company-owned
banks are not subject to the BHCA's insurance prohibitions, yet activities of
such banks' nonbank subsidiaries are subject thereto. 43 The court declined
to resolve this issue since the facts did not involve nonbank subsidiaries of
holding company-owned state banks. '"
The Board itself has taken steps to clarify the latter issue. 4 As discussed,
the Board's position in its recent rulings'" has been that, although the 1982
amendments to sections 1843(a) and 1843(c)(8) of the BHCA do not prevent
bank subsidiaries of holding companies from directly selling insurance, the
amendments do prevent holding company-owned banks from owning insur-
ance company subsidiaries.' 47 However, the Code of Federal Regulations
still contains a regulation promulgated in 1971 which permits holding com-
pany-owned state banks to own any subsidiaries allowed by state law. 148 In
December of 1988, the Board published a notice of proposed rulemaking to
bring the regulation into conformity with the Board's current view.' 49
In response to the Board's proposed revision of the regulation,' 50 ALTA
again has asserted that the 1982 amendments to sections 1843(a)(2) and
1843(c)(8) of the BHCA prohibit holding company-owned state banks' from
owning title insurance subsidiaries.' 51 ALTA contends that the passage of
the Garn-St Germain Act voided regulation 225.22(d)(2)(ii) insofar as it ap-
pears to authorize any insurance activities by holding company-owned state
bank subsidiaries.' 52
The banking industry's primary counter-argument is that Congress never
intended the BHCA to give the Board jurisdiction over the activities of state
banks or their subsidiaries. 53 The banking industry asserts that to give the
Board this sort of control over state banks and their subsidiaries is contrary
to the dual federal and state bank regulatory systems and violates states'
rights. 154
142. Id. at 1280-81, 1284.
143. Id. at 1282.
144. Id. at 1282-83.
145. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989).
149. 53 FED. REG. 48915 (Dec. 5, 1988).
150. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989).
151. Comments of the American Land Title Ass'n, In the Matter of Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, No. R-0652 (filed with the Board of Governors on Feb. 13, 1989).
152. ALTA also asserts that the Board cannot grandfather any title insurance activities
that state banks' subsidiaries may have undertaken pursuant to the former regulation, since the
regulation was contrary to law. Id. at 6.
153. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
154. Letter to William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System from Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive Vice President of American Bankers Ass'n
regarding Proposed Amendment to Federal Reserve Board Regulation Y As It Applies to
Subsidiaries of State Banks Owned By Bank Holding Companies (Dec. 2, 1988); Letter to
William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from
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Legislation is clearly required to clarify Congressional intent on these is-
sues. Certainly, the answer to whether holding company-owned national
and state banks should be permitted to sell title insurance or own title insur-
ers cannot be deduced merely from construing the language of section
1843(a)(2). 155 Each of the preceding interpretations of the BHCA's insur-
ance prohibitions upon national and state banks' selling insurance and own-
ing insurance subsidiaries possesses merit. 156 Additionally, a judicial
construction of section 1843(a)(2) alone will not permit the distinction
which Congress needs to make between the appropriateness of banks con-
ducting general insurance activities and conducting title insurance activities.
D. Applicability of the FDIC Act
Since 1946, FDIC regulations have prohibited FDIC-insured state banks,
which are not owned by bank holding companies, from "insuring, guarantee-
ing or certifying titles to real estate."' 57 The FDIC's regulation does not
apply to FDIC-insured national banks or to insured state banks belonging to
bank holding company systems, presumably because the National Bank Act
regulates the former and the Board the latter.
Additionally, in 1984, the FDIC published for public comment an amend-
ment to its regulations which would prohibit all insured banks from engag-
ing in insurance underwriting activities, including title insurance
underwriting, regardless of whether they are national banks, state banks
Richard M. Whiting, General Counsel & Secretary to the Association of Bank Holding Com-
panies regarding recission of § 225.22(d)(ii) of the Board's Reg Y (dated Dec. 8, 1988); and
Letter to William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem from Donald G. Ogilvie, American Bankers Ass'n; Thomas L. Ashley, Association of
Bank Holding Companies; Gerard F. Milano, California Bankers Clearinghouse Ass'n; Mark
J. Riedy, National Council of Savings Institutions; Richard L. DeCair, Bank Capital Markets
Ass'n; Lawrence E. Kreider, Conference of State Bank Supervisors; John Belew, Consumer
Bankers Ass'n; Kenneth W. Guenther, Independent Bankers Ass'n of America; John F. Lee,
The New York Clearing House Ass'n; and Anthony T. Cluff, Association of Reserve City
Bankers regarding Docket No. R-0652, Proposed Amendment to Federal Reserve Board Reg-
ulation Y As It Applies to Subsidiaries of State Banks Owned By Bank Holding Companies
(Dec. 22, 1988) (the individuals formally filed these letters with the Federal Reserve Board in
response to the Board's request for public comment on its proposed recission of 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.22(d)(ii)).
155. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
156. See Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275(1989), in which the Second Circuit repeatedly pointed to the ambiguity of the BHCA on these
questions:
... we cannot say that the provisions of the Act reveal an unambiguous congres-
sional intent concerning the precise question .... Id. at 1281; Both sides claim
that the text of the Act supports their interpretations, and each can find some,
but not overwhelming, support in various words and phrases.... Id;... use of
these phrases... might imply a deliberate congressional choice not to restrict
the activities of bank subsidiaries... but might also result from drafting differ-
ent clauses at different times and assembling them without intending differences
in phrasing to have significance. Id.
However, the court found that so long as regulatory agency interpretations of the BHCA
are reasonable, only Congress has the power to change them, through legislation. Id. at 1284.
See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.




owned by bank holding companies, or independent state banks.158 However,
because of objections from the OCC and the Board, the FDIC aborted the
proposed rulemaking in 1987.159 Since 1987, the FDIC has reportedly con-
tinued to work with the OCC and the Board to develop regulations to pro-
hibit all types of insurance underwriting by all FDIC-insured national and
state banks. 16° The FDIC purportedly has concluded that the risks to the
safety and solvency of the federal deposit insurance fund from banks' under-
writing and marketing insurance outweigh any benefits obtained from al-
lowing banks to provide insurance for their customers. 161
E. Congressional Activity, 1988 - 1990
All that is apparent from the preceding examination of statutes and regu-
lations is their inconsistency and the impossibility of stating that one inter-
pretation is clearly correct or incorrect. 162 Certainly the opinions of the
various bank regulators regarding the permissibility of title insurance activi-
ties for banks, bank holding companies, and their subsidiaries are in disar-
ray. Commentators writing on the question of whether banking entities are
permitted to sell general insurance have similarly disagreed on how Con-
gress intended the various relevant statutes and regulations to be
reconciled. 163'
In fact, because of the controversies, in each of the past two years, bills
have been introduced in Congress to resolve at least some of the issues. In
1988, the Financial Modernization Act was introduced in the United States
Senate, as an amendment to the Glass-Steagall Act. 164 The bill proposed to
permit national banks to expand into securities and insurance sales. 165 Sena-
tor Cranston of California attached an amendment to the bill which specified
that title insurance is included within the insurance activities the BHCA
prohibits for direct and indirect subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 166
The Senate passed the bill in this form; however, the House of Representa-
tives did not approve it before Congress recessed for the year. 167
In April of 1989, Congressman Carper of Delaware introduced an amend-
158. 50 FED. REG. 23963; Hochberg, Banks, Bank Holding Companies and Title Insur-
ance, 68 TrrL NEws 14, 33 (July - Aug. 1989).
159. 52 FED. REG. 48447 (1987) (FDIC withdrawal of rule proposed Nov. 26, 1984). See
also Huber, supra note 25, at 162. Huber asserted that the FDIC "used to" prohibit state
banks from insuring, guaranteeing, or certifying titles to real estate, but that "the FDIC now
permits ['stand-alone'] insured state banks to undertake these activities." Id For this proposi-
tion, Huber cites the FDIC's 1987 withdrawal of the rule it had proposed in 1984. Id. The
withdrawal of that proposed rule, however, merely eliminated the possibility of additional re-
strictions on the ability of all banks to sell title insurance; the FDIC did not repeal 12 C.F.R.
§ 332.1 (1989).
160. Hochberg, supra note 158, at 33-34.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 26-161 and accompanying text.
163. See generally supra note 25 (citing commentators discussing Congressional edicts re-
garding sale of general insurance by banking entities).






ment to the BHCA in the House. 168 The proposed amendment specifically
exempted bank subsidiaries which conduct activities permissible under state
law from any activity restrictions of the BHCA.169 At this writing, Bill No.
1723 has not left the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Commit-
tee, 170 nor is it expected to before Congress adjourns for the year. If passed,
the bill would resolve few of the issues discussed herein. Essentially, the bill
would permit bank holding company-owned state banks to own insurance
subsidiaries, including title insurance subsidiaries, in the few states where
state law permits.171 The bill does not address the issues of national bank
ownership of title insurance subsidiaries or national or state bank direct title
insurance sales.' 72 Additionally, the bill fails to answer questions regarding
subsidiaries of national and state banks which are not owned by bank hold-
ing companies. 173
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
Any new legislation or amendment of existing law will continue to be
problematic unless Congress stops treating general insurance and title insur-
ance as one. For years the general insurance industry has unsuccessfully
sought legislation to keep banks and bank holding companies out of the gen-
eral insurance business. 174 Congress has not been convinced of significant
adverse effects upon the public from lender control of general insurers and
lender sale of general classes of insurance. Despite the rhetoric about the
intent behind the NBA and the language of the BHCA, the majority of
lawmakers have seen the dispute between banking regulators and the general
insurance industry as purely economic - with the bank regulators generally
supporting banks extending their profit-making activities, and the insurance
industry attempting to eliminate a source of competition.
Many of ALTA's arguments regarding the proper interpretation of the
NBA and the BHCA echo those previously asserted by the general insurance
industry. Of course, ALTA is motivated by the same economic interest as
the general insurance industry, i.e., concern for the effects of competition
168. H.R. 1723, 101st Congr, 1st Sess. (April 6, 1989).
169. Id. § 2.
170. Congressional Index (CCH) 26,157 - 16,158 (1990).
171. See H.R. 1723 § 2, 101st Congr., 1st Sess. (April 6, 1989).
172. Id.
173. Id
174. See supra note 163. As Huber aptly noted,
The banking and insurance industries are engaged in a protracted war over
the extent to which banks and bank holding companies... may sell and under-
write insurance. This war is now over three decades old, and no end is in sight.
Battles have been fought in congress, state legislatures, the courts, and the me-
dia. The insurance industry regards the sale and underwriting of insurance as
not incidental or closely related to banking, antithetical to the public interest,
and perhaps even a threat to the survival of the present industry structure.
Banks view many insurance activities as intimately related to the business of
banking and see the insurance industry as obstructing rational organization of
economic activity, simply because it fears competition.
Huber, supra note 25, at 147-48.
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from a new source of title insurance upon existing title insurers. For this
reason, it has been easy for banking regulators, courts and legislators to dis-
miss ALTA's complaints, as they have formerly dismissed those of the gen-
eral insurance industry.
What regulators and legislators have overlooked is the uniqueness of title
insurance among classes of insurance. Its special role as both indemnifier
and eliminator of risks in real estate transactions deserves separate consider-
ation. Scrutiny into the distinctive nature of title insurance reveals that the
policies against title insurance activities are much more compelling than the
policies against general insurance activities by banks and bank holding com-
panies. 175 These differences between title insurance and other types of insur-
ance warrant legislation specifically to prohibit bank holding companies,
national and state banks, and their subsidiaries from underwriting and sell-
ing title insurance.
A. Special Roles of Title Insurance
While title insurance has similarities to other general insurance forms, its
origin in the context of real property transactions and the financing thereof
has given title insurance several unique characteristics. 176 Today title insur-
ance is the preferred method of protecting purchasers and lenders in the
United States against loss from unexpected encumbrances and undiscovered
claims to real property. 177 In many states the purchase of title insurance has
all but displaced attorney's title opinions and abstracts, the traditional means
of title assurance, as the way to ensure that investments in real property will
not turn out to be losses.'178
The development of title insurance and the growth of the industry was a
reaction to the inability of abstracts and attorney's title opinions to ade-
quately protect land purchasers. 179 Under the attorney opinion method of
title assurance, a potential buyer or mortgagee of real property retains an
attorney to search the public records, weigh the facts shown, and provide a
written opinion as to the condition of title.' 80 The attorney's opinion also
sets forth any actions to remove encumbrances or cure title defects which the
purchaser or lender should take prior to closing the transaction in order to
acquire a marketable title. The attorney might perform the title search per-
sonally or hire an abstractor to perform the search at the various record
offices and supply the attorney with an abstract of all documents on rec-
175. The author has read the briefs of ALTA & NYLTA and ALTA & TLTA, the OCC,
and the Board which were filed in cases cited supra notes 17-24. Some of the concerns raised
infra in text accompanying notes 176-267 were asserted or refuted in these briefs.
176. J. Palomar, Liability of Title Insurers, in B. Dunaway, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED
REAL ESTATE, 27B-3 (2d ed. 1989).
177. Palomar, Title Insurance Companies' Liabilityfor Failure to Search Title and Disclose
Record Title, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 455, 457 (1986-87).
178. Palomar, supra note 176, at 457. See Whitman, Optimizing Land Title Assurance Sys-
tems, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 40, 47-49 (1973); Note, Washington Title Insurers' Duty to
Search and Disclose, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 212 (1980).
179. Palomar, supra note 177, at 458.
180. Id. Comment, Title Insurance: The Duty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161, 1163 (1962).
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ord. 18  The attorney and abstractor are each charged with a duty to exercise
reasonable care in conducting the title search and preparing the abstract
and title opinion.'1 2 If a client suffers a loss because of a title defect, which
was discoverable from the record, the client has a potential claim against
either the attorney or the abstractor for negligence.18 3 However, neither the
attorney nor the abstractor will be liable for failure to discover or disclose
defects that a member of the profession, exercising reasonable care, would
not find or disclose. 184
The real property purchaser or mortgagee who relies on an abstract and
attorney's opinion, thus, will not be protected against losses resulting from
any one of the multiple title defects which cannot be detected from a reason-
able search of the public records. 85 Inherent weaknesses in the gran-
tor/grantee recording system utilized by most county recording offices in the
United States, 18 6 make these incompensable losses far too common. 87 For
example, neither abstractor nor attorney is liable for failing to find an instru-
ment erroneously recorded outside the chain of title being searched.18 8 Ad-
ditionally, misspellings of names, name changes, fraud, forgery or duress in
the execution of instruments, apparent deeds which are actually mortgages,
executions of documents by minors or incompetents, improper notice in ju-
dicial proceedings, undisclosed marriages and divorces, and pretermitted
heirs all may cause title defects which are not discoverable through a reason-
able search of public records. That local custom may limit attorneys and
abstractors' title searches to only a few public offices increases the problem
of incompensable losses. In fact, records affecting interests in land may be
found in the offices of the register of deeds, probate court, county court, city
council, secretary of state, county auditor, tax assessor, tax collector, and
even the federal register. i89 Further, when an attorney or abstractor discov-
ers an encumbrance or title defect, but fails to require that it be cleared
before the client takes title or disburses loan funds, the injured client has no
recourse as long as the attorney or abstractor exercised reasonable care.
Even in the event of blatant negligence, whether the client actually recovers
depends entirely upon the solvency of the individual lawyer or abstractor.190
The inability of abstracts and attorneys' opinions to offer protection
against so many potential title defects prompted the development of title
insurance. 19' Title insurance supplemented the former method of title assur-
181. Whitman, supra note 178, at 47-48.
182. Palomar, supra note 177, at 458.
183. Comment, supra note 180, at 1164.
184. Id. at 1164.
185. Palomar, supra note 177, at 458 (citing Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 195-96
(1979); Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 168 (1868)).
186. See Palomar, supra note 171, at 458 n.21 for a discussion of the weaknesses in gran-
tor/grantee recording system.
187. Id. at 458.
188. Comment, supra note 180, at 1163-64.
189. In one instance, a company reported examining seventy-six sources of information in
sixteen public offices. Comment, supra note 168, at 1164 n. 25.
190. Palomar, supra note 177, at 458.
191. The first title insurance company is said to have formed in reaction to a Pennsylvania
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ance by indemnifying for losses caused by encumbrances and title defects
which are undiscoverable even with the exercise of reasonable care. 192 Title
insurance retains from attorney's title opinions the important features of pre-
liminary title search and disclosure to the applicant of all discovered encum-
brances and title defects prior to the closing of the real estate transaction.
Thus, title insurance contrasts with virtually all other insurance forms be-
cause it is structured on the concept of risk elimination, not solely on risk
assumption and distribution of loss. 193 Prior to the issuance of the policy, a
title insurance company employee, or an attorney or abstractor acting as the
title insurer's agent, searches the real property records pertaining to the
property interest to be insured.194 When the search uncovers encumbrances
or title defects, the title insurer discloses them to the applicant before the
real estate transaction closes. This disclosure provides the applicant with an
opportunity to require the seller or mortgagor to cure the identified defects
before completing the transaction. 195
The title insurer's title examination cannot be equated with any prelimi-
nary fact-gathering or analysis of loss expectancy and actuarial tables other
types of insurers perform to assess the risk of insuring a particular appli-
cant. 196 The title insurance company's preliminary title examination is
much more. It is proffered as a substitute for both the record search and
abstracting of a professional abstractor, and the opinion of an attorney as to
the legal status of title. Indeed, the preliminary title examination is the main
focus of title insurance, with as much as ninety percent of the title insurance
premium paying for its cost. 197
To facilitate accurate title searching, title insurance agencies have invested
large sums to build private title plants with real property records indexed by
tract of land, and to index on computer probate court, tax lien, and some-
Supreme Court holding that a conveyancer was not liable for loss to his client from a judgment
lien which the conveyancer reasonably believed would not be a lien upon his client's title. See
Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 168 (1868); Palomar, supra note 177, at 458 n. 24.
192. Id. at 459.
193. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Research Loan & Inv. Corp., 361 F.2d 764 (8th Cir.
1966) ("[t]itle insurance is also more than a contract of indemnity, usually the essence of the
title insurance transaction is to obtain a professional title search, opinion, and guarantee").
See also Roberts, Public Regulation of Title Insurance Companies and Abstracters, 5 (1961)
(title insurance not based on mere guesswork as fire insurance or automobile insurance; instead
it is based on reports prepared by skilled technicians evaluating the risk); NIBLACK, ABSTRAC-
TORS AND TITLE INSURANCE 157 (title insurance is not the taking of a risk on the validity of
the title, rather the theory is that no known risks are taken).
194. Palomar, supra note 177, at 459 n. 28.
195. For a discussion of the standard form Commitment to Insure, Owner's Title Insur-
ance Policy and Loan Policy used by most of the nation's title insurers, see J. Palomar, Liabil-
ity of Title Insurers, in B. DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE, 27B-5 to
27B-27 (2nd ed. 1989). For legal issues involving the title insurer's duty to search and disclose
the status of record title, see Palomar, supra note 177, at 455-68.
196. "Title insurance is not based on mere guesswork as are fire insurance or automobile
insurance. It instead is based on reports evaluating the risk which are prepared by skilled
technicians." ROBERTS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND AB-
STRACTERS 5 (1961).




times zoning and planning records.198 The local title insurance agencies'
tract indexes trace title based on the legal description of parcels of land.
Each tract of land is given a number and a place in the tract index. All
transactions involving a particular tract then are recorded on a single page,
or consecutive pages, under the tract number. The tract system is more effi-
cient than the grantor/grantee index system, since the examiner needs to
search only the one set of records involving the tract being insured, rather
than the multiple indexes containing the name of each grantor and grantee
in the chain of title.199 The tract index system's efficiency also stems from
the fact that it is not dependent upon the correct spelling of grantor and
grantees' names.200 Furthermore, a tract index can reveal "wild deeds"
which could not be found in a grantor/grantee index.20 1
Thus, because of the tract index format for real property records, and
because other relevant records gathered from various county offices are
made accessible through a single computer search, title insurance companies
today provide the most efficient and accurate title searches ever available.20 2
County record offices simply have not had the money to duplicate these
technologies. 203 In many localities where title insurers own private plants,
the public records are virtually unused except for the title insurance agency's
daily take-offs and occasional inquiries for copies of specific documents.
Moreover, only title insurers affirmatively assist insureds in eliminating dis-
covered risks and avoiding losses. Title insurance applicants may request
the insurer's assistance with procedures and documentation necessary for
curing any encumbrances and title defects discovered.
The attention title insurers give to risk elimination and loss avoidance ben-
efits not only the insurer, but also the insured and society as a whole because
land may be invested in, developed, and improved with less danger that a
superior claimant will later challenge the title.2°4 Investors need to know
that property can be used for their intended purposes. Investors want assur-
ance that the title is marketable before closing a transaction, not merely fi-
nancial reimbursement if forced to defend against adverse claims, or to alter
or interrupt their use of the property after having labored to develop and
improve it. When title risks are reduced, investment and development of
real property are naturally encouraged. Additionally, society's resources are
allocated more efficiently and waste is prevented when purchasers are kept
198. Palomar, supra note 177, at 459. See also Taub, Rights and Remedies Under a Title
Policy, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 422, 422-23 (1980); Whitman, supra note 178, at 59;
Comment, supra note 180, at 1164.
199. Palomar, supra note 177, at 459 n.29.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 459.
203. Id.
204. As one commentator explained:
If title insurance generally were written on a risk basis only, without search or
examination, there would be a gradual deterioration in the certainty of titles. It
is the curative action taken by owners upon receiving examination reports from
insurers that maintains the high degree of record title certainty of insured titles.
Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 516 (1957).
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from investing in land they cannot develop because of an encumbrance or
title defect.
Furthermore, the risk elimination teatures of title insurance have been
credited with increasing the availability of funds for real estate loans in the
United States.205 Large investors such as life insurance companies and na-
tional banks have been encouraged to buy millions of dollars of first mort-
gage loans because the priority of their liens is insured.2°6 Title insurance
has strengthened these investors' confidence in the mortgage market by pro-
viding (1) a form of title assurance that is standardized throughout the coun-
try,207 (2) a promise that the title insurer will negotiate or litigate any claims
which arise against the collateral, and (3) a financially sound corporation to
indemnify investors for any loss caused by the failure of a mortgage lien.208
As long as investors remain willing to buy insured mortgage loans, members
of the public can count on a steady infusion of money into local banks and
savings and loan institutions which will be available for loans for home
purchases and real estate development.
Thus, lenders acting as or controlling title insurers raises several concerns
for the public that are not raised by lender control of general insurers. These
concerns include potential conflicts of interest, decline in the integrity of title
insurance underwriting, retrogression of title insurance's role as eliminator
of risks, degeneration of our nation's real property records, and decreased
availability of mortgage money throughout the United States.
B. Conflicts of Interest
When a lender who makes loans for real property purchases also sells title
insurance, owns a title insurer, or is the sister-company of a title insurer,
conflicts of interest exist in at least three forms. First, a conflict may exist
between the loan applicant's interest in obtaining the cheapest title insurance
from the most reliable insurer and the bank's interest in capturing the appli-
cant's title insurance business for itself or its affiliated insurer. Second, a
conflict may arise between the borrower's interest in obtaining clear title and
the lender-controlled title insurer's interest in approving title so that the
lender may acquire the loan transaction. Third, a conflict may exist between
a lender-controlled title insurance agent's duty to minimize the under-
writer's exposure and its interest in approving title so that the lender may
secure the loan transaction.
Regarding the first conflict of interest, it is ironic that the OCC cited the
efficiency for borrowers of obtaining title insurance when negotiating the
mortgage as a reason for granting national banks the authority to sell title
205. ROBERTS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACT-
ERS, 18 (1961).
206. Id.
207. Id Roberts asserts that the prime requisite for national companies investing in the
secondary real estate mortgage market is "a freely transferable mortgage" and security behind
it that is "everywhere acceptable." Id.
208. See Roberts, Title Insurance: State Regulation and the Public Perspective, 39 IND. L.J.
1, 8 n.22 (1963); Johnstone, supra note 204, at 503.
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insurance. 209 The Board included the same reason when granting First Wis-
consin Corporation (Firstar) permission to acquire a title insurance
agency. 210 The Board at least acknowledged the potential conflict of interest
and specifically premised its permission on First Wisconsin's express agree-
ment not to tie loan approvals to purchases of title insurance from its
agency. 211
A lender that sells title insurance or owns a title insurer has an economic
incentive to tie its other services to the applicant's agreement to purchase
title insurance from the lender or its title insurance subsidiary. The lender
profits from direct commissions when it sells title insurance and from divi-
dend payments when it owns a title insurer. The peril to the public is that
consumers may be steered to the bank's or its subsidiary's title insurer over
others that may provide greater coverage, lower rates or better service.
Recognizing the conflict of interest, in 1982 Congress enacted legislation
making it a violation of the controlled business provisions of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") for a lender to expressly tie approval
of a federally-related mortgage loan to a title insurance purchase from a par-
ticular entity.212 To avoid penalties under RESPA, a lender must, at or
prior to the time of referrals, (1) inform consumers of the existence of the
controlled business arrangement, (2) provide consumers with a written esti-
mate of the affiliated title insurance company's charges, (3) inform consum-
ers that they are not required to use the services of the affiliated title insurer,
and (4) accept nothing of value from the title insurer, other than a return on
an ownership interest.213 Borrowers referred in violation of RESPA may
recover three times the amount they paid for the title insurance premium. 214
Even without illegal coercive tying, however, a mortgage lender can effec-
tively refer the majority of its borrowers' title insurance applications to its
preferred title insurer. Since consumers purchase title insurance only on the
few occasions that they buy real property, and since the cost of title insur-
ance is a relatively small portion of the transaction total, borrowers have
little incentive to comparison-shop. 215 Borrowers are generally willing to let
a loan officer or real estate broker direct them to the insurer with whom the
bank or broker most often deals. Frequently, borrowers simply allow their
209. See Interpretive Letter No. 368 (July 11, 1986), Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, 1985-87 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,538; see also Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, ALTA & NYSLTA v. Clarke, 89 Civ. 6939 (MJL), at 10-11(filed Jan. 2, 1990); American Land Title Ass'n & Texas Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, No. A-87-
CA-408 (W.D. Tex. filed July 2, 1987).
210. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
211. See First Wisconsin, supra note 7. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
212. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (Supp. 1989). Section 8 of RESPA also prohibits a title insurance
agency or underwriter from giving, and a mortgage lender from accepting, any thing of value
- or any kickback - for the referral of title insurance business incident to a federally-related
mortgage loan.
213. Congress added this list of steps through which lenders could avoid liability under the
anti-kickback provisions in 1983 amendments to RESPA.
214. See 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (Supp. 1989).
215. See D. Cleasby, Controlled Business Operations in the Title Insurance Industry, RE-
PORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE, STATE OF WISCONSIN 5 (July 31, 1987).
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loan officer or real estate broker to make the title insurance application for
them.
Figures from a 1987 report to the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance
bear this out.216 In Montana, one title insurance company's market share
increased from eleven to fifty-two percent in the first four years after a lender
acquired it. 217 In Minnesota, the state's largest savings and loan acquired a
majority interest in a title insurance company in 1979.218 From April, 1979,
to August, 1980, the amount of business referred to the title insurance com-
pany from the savings and loan increased from twelve percent to more than
eighty-three percent. ALTA conducted a separate review of the mortgages
recorded in seven counties in Minnesota in the first five months of 1988
which indicated that two savings banks, T.C.F. Savings Bank and First Min-
nesota Bank, had ninety-four percent and ninety-six percent of their mort-
gage transactions recorded by their respective captive title insurance
agencies, North Star Title, Inc. and Warranty Title Company.219
Besides the potential that consumers will be directed to a poorer quality,
higher-priced title insurer, the report to the Wisconsin Insurance Commis-
sioner predicted additional negative effects from even legal referrals by lend-
ers to affiliated title insurers.220 First, a lender-affiliated title insurance
company may inflate its prices above levels required by the market, since it is
assured a steady flow of customers. 221 Second, lender control of title insur-
ers may create reverse competition that drives prices up rather than
down.222 If a lender acquires a title insurance agency that begins to garner
an increasing share of the market, title insurance underwriters will offer that
agency greater incentives to channel business to them.223 These incentives
must take the form of either higher commissions to the controlled title insur-
ance agency or payment of the same commission to the agency for less work
in searching, examining and clearing titles. 224 Ultimately, purchasers and
sellers of real estate would bear the cost through higher title insurance pre-
miums or increased losses resulting from diminished attention to the title
examination and elimination of risks.
An equally serious consequence of reverse competition is the potential
failure of existing title insurance agencies which are not affiliated with banks
or bank holding companies. As discussed above, the fixed costs of maintain-
ing sophisticated title plants and training personnel to perform title searches




219. Letter to Michael J. O'Rourke, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
from Sheldon E. Hochberg, Counsel for the ALTA regarding Application of First Wisconsin
Corporation to Acquire Milwaukee Title Insurance Service, Inc. at 15-16 (Aug. 19, 1988).
220. Cleasby, supra note 215, at 4. Accord G. Lawhun, Who Changed the Relationship?, 69




224. Lawhun, supra note 220, at 30.
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to monopolize a significant portion of the market, independent agencies will
be forced to raise prices to cover fixed costs, forego computerization and
other improvement of land title records, or close their doors.225 Title insur-
ance agencies affiliated with lenders, on the other hand, will be insulated
from competitive pressures in trying to obtain business because they can ex-
pect to receive a high percentage of referrals from the lenders.
The consequences of a lender's referring a homebuyer or auto buyer to an
affiliated insurance agency for the initial policy purchase are not nearly so
severe. If the insurer's service is poor or if the buyer learns later of lower-
priced insurance, the buyer can cancel the policy at any time or change in-
surers when it is time to renew. The lender-owned homeowner's or auto
insurance agent will thus have an incentive to keep prices and products com-
petitive to earn insureds' renewal business. Furthermore, though independ-
ent insurers may have been foreclosed from obtaining the initial policy
because of the lender's referral to its own insurer, they will not be foreclosed
from competing for renewal business.
Conversely, independent title insurers have no renewal business for which
they can compete. Instead of being based on term of coverage as are general
classes of insurance, title insurance is a percentage of the value of the prop-
erty interest insured, e.g., $3.50 per thousand for an owner's policy and a
smaller amount for a mortgagee's policy. The insured pays a single pre-
mium at the time the policy goes into effect. Payment of this one premium
protects the insured throughout the entire time the insured owns an interest
in the property, whether that period spans one month or fifty years. Thus,
the only possible competition for title insurance business is at the time the
mortgage loan is made and the property is purchased. As discussed above,
since consumers do not expect to buy title insurance often and the price is
not enough to create an incentive to shop around, they are likely to accept
their lender's recommendation of a title insurer.226 Therefore, the lender-
affiliated title insurer's competitive advantage and the adverse competitive
consequences to independent title insurers are much greater than is the case
with general insurers affiliated with banks or bank holding companies.
Several state legislatures have recognized and attempted to minimize the
effects of reverse competition by limiting the amount of business a controlled
title insurance agency can receive from its bank owner or sister-companies.
California, Michigan, Colorado, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Utah, Nebraska, and
Kansas statutorily limit the amount of business that title insurance agencies
may receive from their bank owners or holding company affiliates to a small
percentage of the agencies' gross operating revenues. 227 The Model Title
225. Cleasby, supra note 215, at 5. See also Hofflander & Shulman, The Distribution of
Title Insurance: The Unregulated Intermediary, 44 J. RISK & INS. 435, 440 (1977) for a discus-
sion of the adverse impact of lender-controlled title insurers on the potential entry of new
independent title insurance companies into the market.
226. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
227. California restricts controlled business to fifty percent, Michigan to fifteen percent,
Colorado and Utah to thirty-three and a third percent, Wyoming to twenty-five percent, and
Nebraska to 20 percent. Cleasby, supra note 215, at 5-6.
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Insurance Code, promulgated by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and recommended to state legislatures in 1982, contains a
provision limiting a title insurance company's controlled business to no more
than twenty percent of its gross operating revenues.228
The second potential conflict resulting from lenders controlling title insur-
ers arises between the borrower's interest in obtaining clear title and the
lender-controlled title insurer's interest in approving title so that the lender
may acquire the loan transaction. The report to the Wisconsin Insurance
Commissioner predicted that a title insurer affiliated with a lender would be
influenced to approve issuance of a title policy despite the existence of a title
defect, so as not to jeopardize the loan transaction.229 Some liens or encum-
brances against property that do not concern mortgage lienholders may ad-
versely affect the owner's use or enjoyment of the property. For example, as
long as a lien is junior to the mortgage lien, the mortgage lender need not be
concerned; however, such a lien could cause a loss to the purchaser. Simi-
larly, a utility easement might not significantly affect the value of the
lender's mortgage lien, but it would concern the property owner wishing to
build a pool, garage or other improvement in that area. A lender acting as,
owning, or affiliated with a title insurer may influence the insurer to issue the
insurance policy upon a finding that the title is free of encumbrances and
defects affecting the lender, without delaying the transaction to clear title
defects that only affect the purchaser. The insurer could simply except from
the policy's coverage any defects that do not affect the lender. Unsophistica-
ted purchasers, such as many homebuyers, might rely upon a title insurance
policy and close the transaction, unaware that exceptions to the policy sub-
ject them to risk.
A third potential conflict arises where a lender acts as or controls a local
title insurance agency, in particular. The conflict exists between the lender-
controlled title insurance agent's duty to minimize its underwriter's exposure
and its interest in approving title so that the lender may secure the loan
transaction. Generally, the local title insurance company, not the under-
writer, owns the private title plant where the title company searches title as
agent for the underwriter prior to issuance of the title insurance policy. 230
Also, it is typically the local title insurance agent that examines the title
chain and then determines whether to insure the title, whether to provide
coverage for marketability, whether conveyance and mortgage documents
are properly executed, and what liens, encumbrances and defects must be
excepted from the policy's coverage. The local agency then issues the policy,
according to its findings, in the underwriter's name. Thus, the title insur-
ance agency is commonly the determiner of the risks which the underwriter
assumes under each policy. 2 31
A bank holding company or bank that owns a title insurance agency may
228. Id.
229. See Cleasby, supra note 215, at 4.




be in a position to influence the agency's decisions regarding the policy cov-
erage and exceptions. Absence of coverage for a particular type of encum-
brance or title defect can result in either the real property purchaser or the
mortgagee refusing to complete the underlying real estate transaction. Not
uncommonly, a lender will approach the title insurance agency about elimi-
nating a particular exception or insuring over a defect so that the bank can
approve the loan and allow the deal to close. When the lender owns the title
insurance agency or is a sister-company with the same bank holding com-
pany parent, the agent experiences more pressure to insure over the objec-
tionable title defect and let the underwriter assume any risk of loss.
However, a title insurance agent also owes contractual and fiduciary duties
to minimize the exposure of the title insurance underwriter on whose behalf
it issues policies. The agent is obligated by the agency agreement 232 to
search the real property records and except from the policy's coverage any
discovered defects that pose unreasonable risks to the underwriter.
The title insurance agency owned by a bank or bank holding company
thus faces a conflict between its duty to limit the underwriter's exposure and
its interest in giving the greatest scope of title insurance protection to the
bank holding company or bank parent's mortgages and the ownership inter-
ests of their borrowers. This conflict is sharpened when a bank holding com-
pany or a bank itself acts as a title insurance agent. The mortgage lender
that acts as agent for the issuance of policies insuring its own mortgage liens
must choose between its own interest as an insured in obtaining the broadest
possible coverage and its contractual and fiduciary obligations to minimize
the risks its underwriter is exposed to under the policies issued.
These latter two conflicts do not exist when a bank holding company or
bank controls an agency selling general lines of insurance. Such agencies
essentially perform only a sales function and are not responsible for substan-
tive judgments regarding the issuance of the policy and the risks the under-
writer will assume.
In and of themselves, these three conflicts of interest would impact nega-
tively upon the real estate buying public in terms of referrals to higher-priced
or less service-oriented title insurers and decreased attention to clearing of
title defects that do not affect the affiliated lender. However, lawmakers
must also consider larger consequences, including (a) potential decline in the
integrity of title insurance underwriting, (b) retrogression of title insurance's
role as eliminator of risks in real estate transactions, (c) degeneration of our
nation's real property records, (d) decreased availability of mortgage money
throughout the United States, and (e) additions to the already huge number
of failures of financial institutions which have occurred in recent years. The
remainder of this article discusses these issues.
C. Decline in Integrity of Title Insurance Underwriting
As discussed above, a title insurer may find itself caught between the
232. An agency agreement is also known as an underwriting agreement.
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lender's interest in completing the loan transaction with the broadest possi-
ble protection for itself, and the underwriter's interest in limiting its risks. If
lender-controlled title insurers opt to resolve the conflict in favor of the
lender by insuring over existing encumbrances or title defects and letting the
underwriter bear the risks, the integrity of title insurance underwriting will
likely decline.
In normal circumstances, a title insurance underwriter would, under-
standably, terminate its agency relationship with an agent that failed to
maintain prudent underwriting standards. But where the title insurance
agent is owned by a bank or bank holding company which has the capacity
to direct a large portion of the region's title insurance business, the under-
writer may reach a different conclusion; unless the underwriter is willing to
forego access to a large portion of the market, it may continue to underwrite
for the bank-affiliated agency. The consequent decline in the integrity of title
insurance underwriting would increase the risk to title insurance underwrit-
ers and to insureds.233
D. Deterioration of Title Insurance's Role as Eliminator of Risks
Additionally, if a title insurance agent responds to a controlling lender's
influence and insures over title defects, title insurance's most socially useful
role as eliminator of risks in real property transactions will deteriorate. 234 If
indemnifying against losses from existing risks were the only role of title
insurance, title insurance would be no more than casualty insurance. 235 Pur-
chasers and developers of real property require more than just indemnifica-
tion from lost investments. They need to be able to obtain marketable title -
a title sufficiently free from doubt and others' claims so that investors can
expend time, labor and money improving and developing the property with-
out fear of losing the property or losing the ability to resell it. Thus, title
insurance must retain its role as discoverer and eliminator of encumbrances
and title defects.
If it becomes common practice to insure over risks rather than to elimi-
nate all apparent risks with each new transfer, many parcels of real property
in the United States will likely become unmarketable. 236 The ultimate con-
233. The insureds which would be affected by increased risk include purchasers of mort-
gage loans in the secondary mortgage market.
234. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. A lender may be satisfied with "insurable
title", i.e., encumbrances or defects may exist in the title to the property which secures the lien,
as long as the lender's title insurance policy covers the defects. The lender's interest is in
recouping the amount loaned; whether repayment ultimately comes from the borrower, a sale
of the real property collateral, or the title insurer if the lender's lien fails, is not critical.
235. Id.
236. See D.B. BURKE, LAW OF TrrLE INSURANCE, 1-2 (1986) stating that:
Because of the permanent nature of land and real property, every parcel of
land has a long, and perhaps even unique, history of transactions between per-
sons who at one time held an interest in it. Each transaction may have involved
a legal or equitable, possessory or nonpossessory, interest; each may have in-
volved either the fee simple absolute to the land or some lesser interest. The
possibility that any one of these types of interests might still exist at the time of
the next transaction presents the danger that it might not be disclosed to the
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sequence could be discouragement of home ownership and real property
development.
Additionally, banks and bank holding companies might not be as willing
as independent title insurance agencies have been to reinvest their profits
toward improving title plant technology and training personnel for the la-
bor-intensive task of examining titles to real property. 23 7 Banks and bank
holding companies' interest in acquiring title insurers began following real
estate boom years and they seem to view title insurance companies as cash
cows. 238 Before bank regulators and lawmakers approve acquisitions of title
insurers, they should determine whether banks and bank holding companies
plan to divert returns to less-profitable subsidiaries or apply the profits as do
independent title insurers to continued automation of land title records and
improvement of title insurance's important risk elimination features. In par-
ticular, when banks or bank holding companies plan to enter the title insur-
ance agency business de novo, rather than acquiring an existing title
insurance agency, any plans to avoid large start-up costs and the difficulty of
finding trained personnel by selling title insurance on a casualty basis should
be disclosed. Commentators agree that issuance of title insurance on a casu-
alty basis is not in the best interest of real property purchasers or of society
as a whole. 23 9
Unless banks and bank holding companies share independent title insur-
ance companies' concerns with discovering and curing defects in land titles,
there could be less emphasis on eliminating risks and greater willingness to
insure titles on a casualty basis. Such a shift would not benefit society at
large which requires stability of land titles to encourage investment in and
development of real property.
E. Deterioration of Real Property Records
A significant consequence of reverse competition and any decrease in
elimination of risks by lender-controlled title insurers is that some title insur-
ers will fail. To the extent that independent title insurance companies sur-
vive, they will have to spread their high fixed costs over a revenue base
purchaser in that later transaction and that he or she might unknowingly take
property that is subject to the pre-existing interest.
237. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Little, Morrow, Toft, & Wender, Financial Services Deregulation: Title
Insurance Implications, 64 TITLE NEWS 17, 19 (Jan.-Feb. 1985).
239. See Johnstone, supra note 204, at 516 contending that:
If broadly applied, the typical casualty insurance approach to risk assumption
could have a disastrous effect on titles. If title insurance generally were written
on a risk basis only, without search or examination, there would be a gradual
deterioration in the certainty of titles. It is the curative action taken by owners
upon receiving examination reports from insurers that maintains the high degree
of record title certainty of insured titles. Elimination of the search and examina-
tion would remove the basis for curative action, and as titles become more un-
certain, losses would increase and insurance rates would go up.
In addition, Johnstone warned that "large title insurers with complete title plants are being
threatened by low overhead insurers operating without title plants ... on the casualty principle
of risk assumption rather than on loss prevention." Id.
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involving fewer transactions, thereby necessitating increased rates and/or
decreased investment in the title plant technology required for reliable title
searches. The danger to the public is that it will be deprived of the most
efficient and accurate records on real property ownership available in their
region. This danger, more than any other, supports legislation to prohibit
bank and bank holding company control of title insurers.
F. Decreased Availability of Mortgage Money
Investors who purchase mortgage loans rely heavily on the validity and
priority of the mortgage liens as determined by independent title insurance
agents. 240 Such investors have been willing to purchase mortgage loans on
properties located outside of their primary bases of operation because of the
security which a standard form of title protection provides. 241 This security
comes from knowing that each mortgage lien was insured after a thorough
title search and examination by professionals who reached independent con-
clusions about the validity of the underlying title as well as the priority and
enforceability of the lien. This independence will be lost if a lender-con-
trolled title insurer makes those determinations, since the lender possesses an
interest in convincing purchasers of its loans that the mortgage liens secur-
ing them are enforceable.
Investors' confidence in the secondary mortgage market may erode with
the knowledge that the lenders selling mortgage loans also control the enti-
ties that insure the mortgage's lien. Investors may have less assurance that
their policies represent a true evaluation of the security provided by the in-
sured parcel of real estate. Certainly, the conflicts of interest already dis-
cussed would undermine the objectivity and integrity of the title insurance
underwriting process and the financial strength of underwriters and might
generate adverse effects on the secondary mortgage market. If these conflicts
cause investors to lose confidence in mortgages as an investment, the ulti-
mate effect will be less money available for loans to the public for real estate
purchases and development.
G. Bank Failures
Bank failures may both result from and cause the failure of title insurers
they own. Expansion by thrift institutions into nontraditional activities
without the necessary expertise recently has precipitated one of the greatest
financial and regulatory disasters ever - the insolvency of a significant seg-
ment of the savings and loan industry and the bankruptcy of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. As banks and bank holding com-
panies similarly seek to expand into nontraditional activities,242 concern is
240. Obviously, if a lien is actually subordinate rather than primary, an investor stands a
good chance of losing the investment, or a large portion thereof.
241. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
242. The OCC cited competitiveness with savings and loans as one of the reasons for per-




raised of potential similar disasters.
Banks and bank holding companies increase their risks by owning title
insurers for several reasons. First, title insurance's profitability during real
estate boom years piqued banks' interest in acquiring title insurers.243 How-
ever, the title insurance business is locked into the same cyclical swings as
the real estate and mortgage lending industries.2 " Permitting banks to sell
title insurance or own title insurers only compounds the cyclical income
problems experienced by banks.245
Second, the conflicts of interest that threaten the public, title insurance
underwriters, and investors in the secondary mortgage market also threaten
the banks and bank holding companies that act as or own title insurers.
When the traditional independence between title insurers and the lenders
they are insuring is lost, the real protection that title insurance is intended to
provide is also lost. In deciding whether or not to approve loans, mortgage
lenders should have independent assessments of the priority and enforceabil-
ity of their mortgage liens.
Mortgage lenders also need for their loans to be acceptable to purchasers
of mortgage loans in the secondary mortgage market. Mortgage lenders may
be handicapped in that market when they insure their own loans. Addition-
ally, any failures of existing title insurers because of inability to compete
with lender-affiliated title insurers threatens banks and bank holding compa-
nies, since the industry presently insures billions of dollars of outstanding
mortgage loans. 24 6
Third, to the extent that one of a bank's primary goals in obtaining title
insurance is to transfer the financial risks of title-related problems and losses
to a third party, a serious question exists as to whether banks accomplish
that goal when insuring their own mortgage loans with title insurance com-
panies they own. The risk of loss may appear to be transferred as a formal
matter, but the burden of loss still rests ultimately on the bank or the hold-
ing company parent.247 The bank does not actually obtain the financial se-
curity that title insurance is designed to provide when it does not transfer the
economic consequences of the risks out of its corporate family.248
Banks insured by their own or affiliated title insurers could threaten the
security that banks need from title insurance in a fourth way. When dealing
with independent underwriters, banks continually review the quality of the
underwriters' services, as well as their financial strength and stability in or-
der to keep alert to conditions that might adversely affect the underwriters'
ability to pay claims against the policies issued.249 When a bank owns or is
243. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
244. Letter to Hoyle L. Robinson, FDIC Executive Secretary from Donald P. Kennedy,
ALTA President regarding Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Activities of
Insured Banks, at 27 (Nov. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Robinson Letter].
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. R. Goshay, Captive Insurance Companies, in H. SNIDER, RISK MANAGEMENT 80, 85
(1964).
248. Robinson Letter, supra note 244, at 21-22.
249. Id. at 23.
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affiliated with a title insurer, however, its review standards may loosen. In
fact, financial difficulties of the affiliated title insurer may only strengthen the
bank's incentive to refer business to the affiliate. If the bank has all or most
of its mortgage liens insured with this one affiliate title insurer, the ultimate
insolvency or failure of that insurer would have enormous adverse conse-
quences on the security of the bank's mortgage loan portfolio. 250
The risks to banks and bank-owned or operated title insurers are circular.
If banks or bank holding companies do fail, for whatever reason, title insur-
ance companies operated or owned by them also will be at risk. One of the
specific reasons which the OCC gave for approving the issuance of title in-
surance by national banks was that title insurance companies operated as
departments of banks from the 1870s until the Depression in the 1930s. 251
Ironically, the OCC admitted that it was the failure of so many banks during
the Depression that prompted title insurers organizing thereafter to operate
independently. 252 Yet, the OCC ignored the obvious concern for the public
that future bank failures could again mean the failure of the underwriter that
issued their title insurance policies or the unavailability of the local title in-
surance agency which owns the most reliable title plant in the locality. An
independent title insurer's failure or the failure of a nonbanking corporation
which owns a title insurer could raise the same concerns. However, few title
insurance underwriters or agencies have failed since title insurers divorced
themselves from bank ownership in the 1930s.
H. Conclusion
Because of title insurance companies' comparatively low loss ratios, bank
holding companies and banks tend to view them as high-profit investments.
The public has an interest in knowing whether banking entities are more
interested in diverting those profits to less profitable subsidiaries than in ap-
plying them as do independent title insurers to continued automation of land
title records and improvement of title insurance's important risk elimination
features. Unless banks and bank holding companies share independent title
insurance companies' concerns with curing defects in land titles, banks could
place less emphasis on eliminating risks and move toward insuring titles on a
casualty basis. This would not benefit society at large which requires stabil-
ity of land titles to encourage investment in and development of real
property.
The Board and the OCC cannot afford to overlook the fact that the use of
title insurance enhances the safety and soundness of banks and bank holding
companies by reducing the financial risks associated with mortgage lending
activities. Yet these regulators fail to recognize that the soundness of both
may be threatened when banking entities own title insurers. The quality of
250. Id.
251. See OCC Interpretive Letters No. 368 (July 11, 1986) and No. 377 (Feb. 6, 1987). See
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
19901
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real property records and the availability of money for home ownership and
real property development in the United States is also threatened.
Since bank regulators continue to ignore public interest in applying ex-
isting laws, the nation's lawmakers must act. Congress must sever the con-
sideration of banking institutions' involvement in the general insurance
business from the transcendent issue of lenders acting as or owning title in-
surance underwriters and agencies. Lawmakers at all levels must appraise
the possibility of (a) conflicts of interest, (b) decline in the integrity of title
insurance underwriting, (c) retrogression of title insurers' role as eliminator
of risks in real estate transactions, (d) deterioration of our nation's real prop-
erty records, (e) decreased availability of mortgage money throughout the
United States, and (f) additions to recent years' overwhelming number of
financial institution failures. These potential effects of lenders acting as or
owning title insurers warrant legislation to specifically and uniformly render
underwriting and selling title insurance beyond the powers of bank holding
companies, national and state banks, and all subsidiaries.
